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Adam Graycar 
Social policy is a broad term which describes systems of 
allocations in any society in which benefits are distributed 
to individuals and communities so that they might attain a 
certain standard of living and/or quality of life. This 
structure of benefits and their distribution is an intensely 
political predicament for there is often great disagreement 
about why anything should be allocated, what it is that is 
allocated, who the recipients ought to be, how generous the 
allocations ought to be, who should do the allocation, and 
how it might be financed. 
In Australia the debates about these issues have closely 
paralleled debates in other affluent industrialised nations. 
Increasing industrialisation has not automatically benefited 
all the people in the community. Industrial progress has not 
eliminated poverty, it has not ensured that all people are 
adequately housed, adequately serviced with health care, have 
adequate access to the employment market, will receive adequate 
incomes. 
It is interesting to reflect on what seemed to be a 
preposterous promise made by an American president when he 
was inaugurated 20 years ago. At the start of the 1960s 
' President Kennedy pledged that by the end of that decade his 
Administration would eliminate poverty in the cities and land 
a man on the moon. Land a man on the moon? He had to be 
kidding. We all know which of these goals was achieved. 
Was the technology of landing a man on the moon more simple 
than that of eliminating poverty? Was the commitment greater? 
Was the management task easier? Absurd as it may seem 
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the answer to these questions is yes, 
The questions we must consider relate to whether we 
have the moral and political commitment, the technology 
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and the management skills to achieve our objectives of social 
wellbeing. Do we know how to formulate, to implement, to 
evaluate policies and programmes that might assist in stating 
welfare state objectives? How do we set our targets? How 
do we plan our strategies? How do we allocate our resources? 
How do we assess the results? These are the central issues 
for social policy in the 1980s. 
Poverty in Australia is far from eliminated. The 
evidence shows that there are high rates of poverty among 
specific population groups. Roughly $10 billion per year 
is spent by the Department of Social Security - this is about 
27% of total commonwealth outlays. Although it has stabilised 
at around 27½% of budget outlays and around 7½% of GDP these 
percentages are much greater than they were a decade ago and 
the fact is that the Fraser government has spent more on 
social security than any previous government. The big question 
of course is why in a modern affluent industrial society is it 
necessary to devote such a large proportion of our gross 
domestic product to welfare. It is obvious that with 
approximately 12% of the population falling below Henderson's 
poverty line and a further 8% having incomes only marginally 
above that line that the benefits of industrialisation are 
not universal. Australia is not alone among the Western 
nations in having high inflation and high unemployment. 
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Current business gloom, current government budget deficits, 
and the sort of rehetoric we see in the media does not 
generally augfltf well for a universally prosperous future. 
Estimates that have been made by Peter Saunders of 
the University of Sydney suggest that since Henderson's 
poverty report was published the percentage falling below 
his austere line have increased by 1 or 2 points. If we 
look back at what we mean by poverty we can trace it 
historically through three distinct phases. First in the 
19th century is the concept of poverty as failure to attain 
a stringent subsistence minimum. It was seen very much in 
very limited material terms. Those who were in poverty 
were deemed to be less eligible for the benefits of our 
society in general. Poverty meant destitution and with it 
was a great sense of stigma and personal inadequacy. These 
arguments about less eligibility gave way in the debates of 
the early 19th century and ultimately in the mid 19th century 
to a concept of a welfare state in which poverty was seenlE 
the failure to attain certain societaly accepted minima. 
Poverty was no longer destitution, it was no longer starvation 
but rather the failure to attain societaly accepted standards 
in housing, the exclusion from education, poor access to health 
care, and the sorts o~ things in general that we take as part 
and parcel of a modern service society. By the 1960s the 
third conception became dominant and that was that poverty was 
seen as lack of access to the sorts of decisions that affect 
peoples lives - poverty was the failure to have any control 
over the sorts of decisions that are important. Poverty 
then was very much equated with powerlessness. The value 
issues, or the rhetoric had shifted to some extent. 
one hand there was the argument about whether the 
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On the 
welfare 
state should be like an ambulance, or a truck, parked at 
the foot of a cliff picking up the pieces and providing aid 
to those who fall, or on the other hand whether it should be 
like an elaborate and all encompassing fence at the top of 
the cliff thus preventing people from falling. Building 
the fence is obviously more humane, but it is considerably 
more expensive, and it makes provision for many people who 
would never stray to the edge. Over time we have flirted 
with the idea of building a fence at the top but we have 
never had any real political or financial commitment to that. 
We have developed a lot of rhetoric about poverty being 
related to powerlessness but its unlikely that we really 
mean that because if we examine carefully our politicians' 
statements we see one thing coming through again and again 
and that is benefits ought to go only to the very neediest 
and those not in that category ought not to receive any 
benefits of any sort outside of market forces. We know 
of course that politically it does not quite work this way. 
Given the very large expenditures we have and given 
that our conception of poverty has reverted to the very 
earliest subsistence view of poverty what we have, in W.A. 
Robson's terms, is a welfare state, but not a welfare 
society. We find in fact that we have three welfare states 
that operate in Australia and in all modern industrial 
nations. On the ,one hand there is the welfare state which 
provides meagre resources:, and a supp0sed safety net for 20% 
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of Australians who exist below or only marginally above 
Henderson's line. Second there is the weLfare state which 
provides access to quality education, health care, and 
fairly highgrade community resources for the middleclasses. 
Third there is the welfare state which provides Mercedes Benz 
and BMW motor cars to a section of the community. This is 
the hidden welfare 
-\>v-\- Mor{-(~ 
poor and rich, who 
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state. 
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Yet its the wage and salary earners, 
pay the costs of the shiny BMW which 
pushed in front of me on the Sydney Harbour Bridge the other 
day and while I was swearing at him I noticed on his bumper 
bar I.a fading sticker which read "join the Australian tax 
revolt". In research done in our Centre we have estimated 
that this third welfare state, that which provides occupational 
benefits and fancy perks to the wealthiest costs the Australian 
tax payer around $5 billion per year. This is about half the 
cost of the social security system which itself is the largest 
single cash flow in our society. Has the we1fare state as we 
know it all been a terrible mistake? Those on the left argue 
that it has not eliminated poverty - it has not lived up to 
any of its promises - it has not altered class relations - if 
anything it has maintained an underclass barely above a 
subsistence level. What redistribution has taken place has 
taken place not across class lines but across the life cycle. 
Those on the right argue it is ineffectual, wasteful and 
morally repugnant. 
Welfare systems allocate three things. They allocate 
cash, they allocate services and in expanding periods they 
allocate power to phe powerless. Understanding the structure 
of these allocations, seeing them in their historical context, 
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seeing them in their economic context, and developing a 
political rationale for them altogether constitute an 
explanation of why our welfare system is beset with such 
paradox. Any form of analysis must look at three distinct 
levels. First what are the values underpinning allocation. 
What are the delivery structures. What are the technologies 
to develop and answer policy questions. These questions 
of course operate at a different level to the much larger 
and more all encompassing questions of the ability of the 
state to redistribute, the structure of the state, and the 
relationship between state and individual. I don't want to 
go into these broader questions today but rather stick to 
questions of value, structure and technology. 
One of the reasons for the dilemmas in modern welfare 
stateism is that there is no unity of opinion about what we 
want our welfare state to do. There is confusion about 
whether the welfare state is designed tolring about adequaitf..ecy, 
equity or equality; whether it is designed to compensate for 
past social injustice and misfortune or perhaps invest for 
the future; whether it is designed to supplement or replace 
income; whether it is designed to provide basic relief, 
provide protection to people at risk or to the society at 
large, whether it is designed to regulate the market, or 
redistribute income are matters which are yet to be clearly 
dealt with. If the objective is to help victims of 
misfortune, to provide a cushion against certain contingencies, 
and relieve, in a minimally acceptable fashion those unable to 
provide for their own needs, then weilifare is about allocations 
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leading to subsistence and little more. If however the 
welfare state is seen as a means of reallocation and 
redistribution of income or power, or an investment by means 
of opportunity security programme then it is more centrally 
part and parcel of economic and political life. But if we 
examine our welfare expenditure in recent years we find that 
allocations have continued in the income area and in fact 
have grown at a faster rate than budget allocations but they 
have declined in what might be called the opportunity security 
areas. Since the Fraser government came into power a 
commonwealth budget has risen slightly in real terms, 
social security and welfare expenditure has risen at a 
faster rate than the budget overall but expenditures in 
health, housing and urban and regional development have 
declined dramatically.in relation to both budget expenditures 
and social security expenditures. 
The structural issues are of vital importance in 
contemporary Australia. we are seeing the structural 
arguments played out at a number of different levels. Five 
years ago I would have argued that the main issue was one of 
federal/state relations. This involved arguments about which 
level of government was to do what. But with most state 
governments bankrupt or on the verge of bankruptcy, and with 
the federal government cutting severely in most areas, 
quibbling about which level of government ought to do what 
doesn't seem to be a central issue at the moment. 
When we look at social systems of care we find there 
are four distinct systems. There is the statutory system. 
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There is the commercial system. There is the voluntary 
sector. And the informal system. Contemporary arguments 
hinge on the distinction between public and private. The 
difficulty I have is drawing a line between public and 
private. While income maintenance measures and services 
provided in the statutory sector are fairly public we cannot 
assume that the services provided by the commercial sector 
and the voluntary sector are necessarily private. Many 
commercial services find themselves regulated and in very 
few cases do free market forces determine both the structure 
of service and quality of service. In the voluntary - or 
perhaps more appropriately called the non-government sector -
we have identified 37,000 agencies in Australia. Many of 
these are small community groups. But a significant number 
have major service provision roles and have very large 
budgets. What we found is that the larger the budget the 
more likely the agency will have substantial funding from 
both commonwealth and state governments. Our 37,000 agencies 
we estimate have a cash flow of around $1 billion per year. 
About $600 million comes from the government - 70% from the 
commonwealth government and about 30% from the state 
governments. It is hard to argue that bodies so heavily 
dependent on government funds are in fact private organisations. 
We have seen a transfer of public funds to private hands but 
in return we have seen the delivery of a whole range of 
services that government neither has the ability, the capacity, 
nor the will to provide. Unfortunately this is not the place 
to go into the arguments about our non-government welfare 
sector but suffice to say that we are dealing with a very 
large number of organisations with substantial resources 
providing a wide, wide range of services and as such they 
are a very significant part of our welfare future and at 
the centre of debates about public and private. The 
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fourth sector, the informal sector, is important also 
because with the great decline in statutory expenditures 
and with the cost squeeze on the non-government welfare 
sector, a new rhetoric is being very firmly espoused and 
that is that families ought to do more for their dependent 
members. In arguments about the institutionalisation and 
normalisation family policy has taken on a new dimension 
and essentially this is that families ought to do more for 
their dependent relatives. What research we have done 
shows that the.family is not abandoning its responsibility 
to elderly people for example but rather the capacity of 
the family to provide care as family policy proponents mar 
wish is not always evident. 
There ire obviously very important policy decisions 
to be made about structural issues and about the point of 
intervention. Not only are there arguments about federal, 
state, and local government relations but even more 
importantly the extent to which commercial services might 
be supported, the non-government welfare sector might be 
supported, and the family might be supported. What is 
also important is what government, or society, might get 
back in return for supporting the commercial sector, the 
non-government weLfare sector, or the family. This 
provides opportunities for endless debate. 
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The third set of issues are the technologies. I 
don't want to spend any time on them today but rather 
the sorts of questions one might ask relate to whether 
the $10 billion we spend on social security plus the 
expenditure in the service area is actually relevant. 
There are technological questions in determining evaluative 
methods, in working out how to identify problems, tn wovking 
out how to direct funds to most pressing problems, in working 
out how to produce effective services, in measuring who wins 
and who loses, in finding out what works, in finding out 
what works best. To a very large extent issues in evaluation 
cannot. be divorced from issues in management. Lack of adequate 
management skills can cripple even the best laid plans. 
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If we turn for a momentCdo some concrete i terns we might 
note that the Department of Social Security alone spends 
$10 billion per year, that is $27 million per day or, if you 
have got your pocket calculators there, $1.1 million ~er hour, 
24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This money provides benefits 
to 3million pensioners and beneficiaries, it does not include 
amounts that go in family allowances but it does include 
amounts that go to veterans. In addition there are substantial 
funds that go to organisations to provide services. The 
$1.1 million per hour has not prevented about l½ million 
people from falling below the very austere poverty line, the 
majority of whom are income support recipients. If we look 
at Australia's demographic structure we find that family 
structure is changing. Around 10% of Australia's families 
are single parent families and in these families there are over 
400,000 children. Whereas 1.4% of two parent families rely 
for their incomes on government social security benefits and 
the figure among single parent families is 42%. Children, 
particularly those in single parent families are among the 
poorest people in our society. My colleague Bettina Cass 
who is working on income security and family matters is 
systematically identifying the way in which our dependency 
patterns are created and structured and in which most of the 
poor in our soci~ty are children and women. 
Australia's labour force has changed dramatically over 
the past decade - with enormous consequences for social policy. 
Full time labour force participation rates dropped between 
1970 and 1980 by 5.6% - 9.4% for women and 1.6% for men. 
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In 1980 16.1% of Australia's labour force was classified as 
part time. This is a rise of 78% on the 1970 figure. 
published a detailed report on the welfare consequences of the 
changing labour force but of course when we talk about the 
labour force we cannot ignore unemployment. I don't want to 
go through all the unemployment statistics but it must be 
pointed out that unemployment is concentrated largely in the 
young - more than half of unemployment :bemeficiaries are under 
25 years of age and in a very cruel way among the older workers 
- that is workers over the age of 45. It is the older workers 
who have been on unemployment benefit for the longest period. 
Particularly depressing is the statistic that 8,000 people over 
the age of 45 have been receiving unemployment benefit for 24 
months or more. But this is only the tip of the iceberg, for 
many older workers, with no prospects in the labour force, do 
not go onto unemployment benefit. The number of men aged 50 
to 59 in receipt of invalid pensions rose by 152% in thelast 
decade. In our research we have found that unemployment, like 
everything else in our society, is unevenly shared. Not only 
is unemployment heavily concentrated in the least affluent 
suburbs, it is concentrated in the families that can stand it 
least. In two parent families, where the husband is employed, 
the unemployment rate for non-dependent children, that is non-
students aged 15 and over, is 8.8%. Where the husband is 
unemployed, the unemployment rate for non-dependent children 
soars to 22.4%. In single parent families the unemployment 
rate for children is 12.5%, in two parent families it is 9.4%. 
An ABS disability survey shows that approximately 13.2% of 
Australians are disabled and of these two-thirds, or 1¼ million, 
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are handicapped. Chronic illness surveys shows that about 
45% of the population experiences some chronic illness and 
that for every 1000 persons there are 803 reported chronic 
conditions, these of course vary with age and among the elderly 
there are something like 1800 chronic conditions per 1000 
elderly people. While we are on the elderly it is interesting 
to note some of the demographic issues there. Today elderly 
people made up about 9.6% of the population and the population 
is ageing slowly but this does have dramatic consequences. 
By the year 2030 it will reach around 14% which is roughly the 
proportion J that prevails in much of Europe today. However, 
life. However life expectancy has increased dramatically this 
century from 47 to 70 for males and from 51 to 77 for females 
and this I would suggest is an achievement and not as some 
government spokespersons might suggest, a calamity. But when 
we think that each day 300 people turn 65 and each day 194 
over the age of 65 die, we realise that our elderly population 
is growing by 106 per day, (or around 39,000 per year). This 
is a fair amount of infrastructure when we translate it into 
support servces, institutional developments and income maintenance 
measures. Furthermore, when we look at income maintenance 
measures we see that the take up rate for pensions is around 
80% and some little calculations show that to support our 106 
elderly people, or at least 80% of them, we need 84 new tax 
payers p~~ day, each earning and paying tax on average weekly 
earnings. But three-quarters of the population earns less 
than average weekly earnings and our tax base has shifted very 
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dramatically over the past decade. There has been a major 
shift towards wage and salary earners as bearers of the main 
tax burden. This has dramatic consequences for the amount of 
revenue that is likely to be raised and redistributed through 
the social security system. But there are other data that are 
important when we look at ageing as well. For example, it may 
seem trite to mention that most elderly males have a spouse and 
most elderly females do not have a spouse. This has 
ramifications for living arrangements and for care patterns. 
Furthermore when we look at questions of income we find that 
about half of the elderly are poor. About 5% earn average 
weekly earnings. About 83% earn less than half average weekly 
earnings. We also find that as we get into higher age groups 
the number of females per 100 increases from about 54 per 100 
in the 65 to 69 age group to 71 per 100 in the 85+ age group. 
Aged females are poorer than aged males. And a distinct mantle 
of disadvantage envelops much of our elderly population. 
There isn't time to go through a lot more of our population 
data but it will be fairly obvious that there ar_e deep and 
divisive issues that cut across the well being of many population 
groups. 
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The 1980s will be a decade of declining economic 
growth, steady or declining public resources and increased 
demands on those resources. Uncertainty and exclusion 
will be the lot of many people in the 1980s - people who 
find they cannot get an income in the labour market; 
people whose education does not buy them a place in the job 
market; people whose skills have been undermined by 
technological change; people whose occupations have been 
rendered obsolete by structural adjustment; family heads who 
receive insufficient infrastructure support to maintain their 
families; women whose productive value is disregarded and 
who are confined to a state of dependence; people who have 
difficulty in achieving satisfaction in housing, services, 
or income, and young people who believe they have no worthwhile 
place in a competitive industrial society. These groups 
cover much of the population and will make claims for a share 
of Australia's welfare state in the 1980s. The conditions 
of Australia's vulnerable and poorest people - those peDsons 
with insufficient income, services and power by virtue of 
their disabilities, isolation, ethnicity and lack of life 
chances - will need humane attention. 
It is likely that the 1980s will see a more unequal 
Australia, with greater wealth coming from exploitation of 
resources, but fewer people sharing this bonanza. Structural 
change, capital intensive industry, fewer opportunities, 
and difficulties in making ends meet will be the broad 
concomitants of exclusion in the 1980s, and a sensitive 
welfare society must strive to broaden the base of inclusion. 
The modern welfare state is the resid~ual 
beneficiary of the growth state. While there has been 
industrial growth and industrial development a surplus 
has been created and generated and it is this that has 
been used to fund welfare expenditure. What we have now 
is a clear and perceptible backlash which contains a 
number of strong sentiments - there is an anti-taxing 
sentiment, there is an anti-bureaucratic sentiment, there 
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is an anti-public expenditure sentiment, and an anti-
recipient sentiment. The argument that has been propagated 
by influential spokesmen is that people who are not in need 
are receiving some of our hard earned resources, and that 
welfare state policies create higher expectations and also 
greater dependency. It is argued that insatiable demands 
are being generated and that we have neither the skill nor 
the money to satisfy these. The solution is seen to be 
a cut in taxes to stimulate the productive sector and at 
the same time to diminish the so called non-productive 
sector. We are in a situation, they argue, of overload 
of system overload where we have over estimated our resources, 
our capacity and our planning and implementing skills while 
demands are escalated out of control. But whether the 
welfare state is able to respond to the demands that are 
generated one thing is very clear. 
The arguments about present and future performance of 
the we1fare state are arguments about claims on the system. 
About social, political and economic claims - and about 
the legi tima·cy of those, iclaims. With a declining economic 
surplus and with greater competition for resources, with 
high unemployment and high inflation, with technological 
change and uncertain work futures I would argue that we 
are in a clai~ c~isis and not an overload crisis. 
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Each individual makes claims on a number of institutions. 
We make claims on government. We make claims on families. 
we make claims on employers (those who have employers) and 
we make claims on the community. We make claims to survive -
to work - to consume - to receive emotional support - to 
re-distribute. The attack on the weLfare state is a 
statement regarding the legitimacy of these claims. For 
example the failure to index unemployment benefit for the 
under 18s is a way of saying that young people do not have 
a legitimate claim on government for income support but 
rather they should make claims on their families. Cries 
of alarm about the increase in the cost of the supporting 
parent benefit is a statement about the legitimacy of the 
claims of single parents. It is suggested that the state 
should not bear the cost but rather the cost should be borne 
by the community (through non-government welfare agencies) 
or in the family. Cuts in child care funding are 
reflections of the legitimacy - the argument here being 
that young children should make claims on their parents 
and their parents in turn should make claims on their 
employers rather than on the state for child care. 
Examples of legitimacy issues could continue. 
The problem seems to be that government does not seem 
to have been able to rank, in times of declining economic 
growth, the claims of the non-working poor, the working 
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poor, the working non-poor, or the non-working non-poor. 
The winners, surprise, surprise, seem to be the working 
non-poor and the reason for this is that Australian society 
is geared to respond to d~~ands, which is what winners have 
rather than to needs which is what losers have. 
Our potential workforce is declining slightly and our 
population is ageing slightly. The net effect is likely 
to be fewer taxpayers to pay more and higher pensions and 
benefits. This is offset by the fact that those in paid 
work are likely to be working in high productivity areas 
and so one could argue the tax base should remain fairly 
constant if not increase. But the argument of course is 
what will be the source of that tax base. It seems that 
the future of the welfare state is not an economic problem 
but rather a political problem. What we find is a situation 
where there is pressure on the economic system, where there 
is argument about whether the economic system has the 
capacity to meet legitimate claims made on it. But what 
we find is a redefinition of legitimacy and of surplus and 
what we find is that the political system is not capable of 
redefining the claims that are made. There is no doubt that 
welfare is a highly political activity, it is certainly big 
business and big politics. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
At the Social Welfare Research Centre we are trying to 
conduct our studies at three distinct levels. At the first 
level we want to understand characteristics of populations 
and we are doing that through profiles, demographic analysis, 
and survey work. At the second level we want to understand 
institutions with which the populations interact. The 
organisations' structures that effect their wellbeing and 
in some way determine the characteristics of our population 
groups. At the third level we want to understand the 
macro social, macro political, and macro economic issues 
that effect not only the structuring of institutions in our 
society, but also ultimately the characteristics of our 
population groups. 
Changing economic, demographic and labour force patterns 
will necessarily mean a different family structure in 
Australia. It will mean less opportunity for a hassle free 
life, it will mean more family disruption through separation, 
divorce and death;I it will mean exclusion from employment 
for some, a growing ageing population, a declining pool of 
potential care takers, greater suburban sprawl, and all of 
those things that make for diversity and inequality. 
Richard Titmuss pointed out some time ago that social 
policy is basically about ·choices between conflicting 
political objectives and goals. Welfare in the 198Os will 
involve perennial disagreements about the permissible degree 
of income and resource inequality. Governments and community 
bodies must create and recreate an evolving social consensus 
' ' 
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which will protect the weak. The search for a consensus 
which ensures the protection of the weak, the v~lnerable, 
and the disadvantage~. must begin with an understanding 
so~~( 
of Australian 0os2e+y structure and Australian political 
life. For these are the determinants of our welfare 
structures. This must be accompanied by an assessment of 
our economic capacity to support financially our welfare 
policies and institutions, and of our political willingness 
to seek and create a social concensus. 
